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How to become an academic philosopher. Academic 
discourse as a multileveled positioning practice 
 
Johannes Angermuller 




In my contribution, I will present the power-knowledge approach to academic 
discourse. Drawing from poststructuralist and pragmatic developments in social 
theory, this model the practical challenge academic researchers have to meet in 
academic discourse: to secure a place in the social world of researchers. The 
researchers who participate in academic discourse typically need to straddle two 
types of positions: on the one hand they need to find their place among the 
many scientific communities, i.e. in the world of specialised knowledge. On the 
other hand, they need to be placed in a higher education institution with its 
status groups, hierarchies and bureaucratic rules, i.e. in the world of institutional 
power. If researchers want to occupy the most desirable positions in the 
academic field, they need to succeed in both worlds at the same time. While 
careers and strategies can differ widely between researchers, researchers engage 
in academic discourse as an ongoing, publication-based positioning practice in 
which symbolic positions need to be gradually turned into institutional 
positions. 
KEY WORDS: Higher education organisations, scientific communities, speech 
act theory, academic discourse, construction of academic excellence 
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What is it that makes researchers succeed as researchers? According to some 
accounts, researchers deal with symbolic problems, i.e. concepts and theories1. 
This is the avowed or unavowed position of many intellectual historians: “good” 
researchers produce well-argued and well-crafted ideas. In other accounts, 
researchers deal with social problems, i.e. power and inequality. This is the 
position of sociologists who insist on the role of scarce resources such as time, 
money etc. which allow certain researchers to stick out from the mass.  
In this contribution, I will make the case for a discursive approach that goes 
beyond this distinction. In this view, research turns out to be a discursive 
practice by means of which researchers try to find their place among the many 
already established positions in the world of research. Researchers are under a 
positioning imperative: in order to exist and to succeed, they need to carve out 
“their” positions among the many other positions already existing. They may be 
motivated by their curiosity to discover the secrets of the world, the pleasure of 
reading and writing, the quest for answers to complex problems or political 
ambitions. However, academic research will not “work” as long as researchers do 
not consolidate their place in a network of relationships with others. Yet if 
researchers rise to the top, it is not because of the inherent quality of their 
research products; research is not driven by good reasoning and proper thinking, 
at least not primarily. Nor can the practice of research be reduced to the simple 
transformation of social into symbolic goods. Rather, research is a discursive 
practice which allows researchers to position themselves and others and also to 
produce what they consider as “excellent” research. 
It is not exactly a new idea to point out the role of the researchers in research. 
Institutionalist sociologists of science (in the line of Merton) as well as the 
laboratory studies (Latour and Woolgar, 1979; Knorr Cetina, 1981; Lynch, 
Livingston and Garfinkel, 1984) have pointed out the social forces in academic 
knowledge production. Yet, existing investigations of academic research tend to 
focus on either of these two domains: the world of knowledge on the one hand, 
where researchers are grouped into specialised scientific communities, and 
power on the other hand, where researchers are placed in status hierarchies.  
With respect to knowledge, the sociology of scientific groups and communities 
(Hagstrom, 1965; Crane, 1972; Abbott, 2001), social and historical 
                                                                   
1 I thank Johannes Beetz, Julian Hamann and Jens Maesse for their comments. 
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epistemologies (Bachelard, 1971; Kuhn, 1968) as well as historians and 
sociologists of science (Collins, 2000; Weingart, 2003) have pointed out the 
social dynamics in communities of specialised knowledge. With a growing 
number of researchers (Price, 1965), the latter need to carve out ever more 
specialised niches in ever more differentiated communities. Here research is 
seen as driven by the social dynamics of specialised knowledge.  
On the other hand, with respect to the power dimension in academic research, a 
number of studies have concentrated on how higher education systems are 
structured (Clark, 1983), how academics participate in decision-making 
processes at universities (Musselin, 2005) and research organisations (Lamont, 
2009), how organisational models circulate worldwide (Meyer, 1980), how 
higher education becomes a capitalist business (Rhoades and Slaughter, 1997; 
Münch, 2011; Jessop and Sum, 2013), what the impact on entrepreneurialism on 
education is (Masschelein, et al., 2006) and how structural power relationships 
are played out between researchers (Bourdieu, 1988). This power-oriented 
strand of research on research often accounts for the positions and resources that 
researchers obtain through institutional decision-making processes. Here the 
driving force for researchers are power structures in academic organisations and 
markets.  
If existing research has tended to equate the practice of academic research with 
one or the other: either the production of specialised knowledge or the exercise 
of power, many academic researchers, especially those at the top, usually have to 
play some role in both spheres. Thus, an attempt at delineating how the two 
worlds are linked in the practice of research has been made, for instance, by 
Bourdieu, who investigates how researchers mediate between symbolic positions 
(their ideas, cultural practices, tastes…) and their socioeconomic positions 
(which reflect mainly economic and political resources). Yet insofar as Bourdieu 
postulates a homology of the positions researchers occupy in these worlds, he 
neglects the conflicting social logics and rationalities with which researchers 
need to cope in their everyday life. As an alternative, more recent approaches 
have been put forth which emphasise the practical skills, the creative 
intelligence and the tacit knowledges of researchers (Camic, Lamont and Gross, 
2011). 
In the following, researchers are seen as agents of a power-knowledge-complex 
who engage in a multitude of practices. If the primary challenge of researchers is 
to straddle the two worlds of knowledge and power, the positioning dilemmas 
that they encounter at every step of their careers push them to prove their 
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practical creativity in articulating ever new solutions – in direct face-to-face 
encounters in departments and at conferences, in the peer networks of their 
academic system as well as in their global disciplinary fields.  
To present the discursive approach to research as knowledge-power, we will 
follow John, a fictitious philosopher, through the different stages of his 
hypothetical academic career (see for a more structural account Lamont, 1987). 
From the very first day, he is torn between at least two social logics: in the 
world of knowledge he needs to be recognised as a member of a specialised 
community and at the same time in the world of power he needs to act as a 
member of academic organisations with a certain status. Starting out as a PhD 
student, he gradually consolidates his position in on-going discursive practices. 
As a result, his visibility achieved through his positioning work grows and 
extends over time and space. At first constructed in the interactions with his 
local supervisor, his position increasingly relates to positions of the national peer 
group as well as to a global disciplinary community. The story ends with his 
position wrapped into and supported by a thick web of ties and bonds with 
many other participants of academic discourse who confirm him as a “big shot” 
through their own discursive practices. While trying to shore up their positions 
and build up their academic career, they cannot exist without ratifying John’s 
position in academic discourse.  
John’s case reminds us of the social constraints that all researchers need to 
respond to whether they eventually succeed in maintaining their symbolic 
position (reputation) and their institutional position (job) or not. If John is cited 
as an example of an academic “success story”, he testifies to the inequalities and 
exclusions researchers need to deal with in their everyday practices as 
researchers. While researchers usually claim to be in pursuit of more or less 
universal true knowledge, they are involved in relationships of power which 
make some academic careers possible and many others impossible. Against this 
background, the following contribution outlines a research programme for the 
analysis of academic discourse as knowledge-power. 
 
DISCOURSE AS A POSITIONING PRACTICE 
To account for research as a discursive practice, we will start with a few remarks 
on the underlying discourse theory. Two broad currents of discourse research 
can roughly be distinguished: while more semantic, content-related approaches 
typically look into what it is that large communities commonly communicate 
about, pragmatic approaches study how utterances (“texts”) are used in (social) 
SOCIOLOGÍA DE LA PRODUCCIÓN INTELECTUAL EN ESPAÑA Y FRANCIA (1940-1990) 
267 
contexts. My approach argues for a bottom-up approach, grounded in a 
pragmatic notion of discourse as a polyphonic positioning practice 
(Angermüller, 2007; Angermüller, 2011; Angermüller, 2012). This pragmatic 
approach to discourse as a positioning practice mediates between three discourse 
theoretical traditions: a) the French discourse analytical tradition which 
conceives of a subject as a discursive effect of the use of language (Benveniste, 
1974; Lacan, 1978; Foucault, 1972; Pêcheux, 1975), b) praxeological approaches 
to discourse from the Anglo-American world such as the analysis of turn-taking 
roles and membership categorization in conversation analysis (Sacks, 1986), the 
theory of speaking instances in situated talk (Goffman, 1981; Strauss, 1959), the 
study of discursive identities in sociolinguistics (Eckert, 2000) and constructivist 
identity theory in social psychology (Billig, 1982; Edwards and Potter, 1992, 
Harré / Davies 1990) and c), approaches in linguistic pragmatics such as 
functional (Halliday, 1978; Ehlich, 2007), enunciative-pragmatic (Maingueneau, 
1993, Angermuller 2013) and metapragmatic approaches (Hyland, 2005; 
Flowerdew, 2001). For my discursive approach, positions can neither be reduced 
to some underlying grammatical depth structures nor are they the ephemeral 
products of a situated activity only. They are realised by means of utterances, 
which are the smallest communicative units of a discourse in which everybody 
struggles to find, keep or strengthen a position on a social terrain where many 
others already have secured their positions.  
Let’s have a look at how John engages in this discursive practice, which allows 
him to mark and occupy his discursive place vis-à-vis others.  
It was on an evening during a dinner with his parents when John expresses his 
wish to go to university:  
 
(1) “I want to become a philosopher,”  
 
he says and his parents agree to send him to the University of Lower Stratford. A 
few months later John attends a class on German idealism where the teacher 
asks him to prepare an assignment on Kant’s political philosophy.  
 
(2) “Kant is a philosopher of the Enlightenment,”  
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his essay starts. As John moves on as a student in philosophy, he processes many 
such utterances, which he reads while writing or writes while reading, and one 
can ask how they allow him to build up his position in a network of positions. 
While the two utterances (1) and (2) can hardly be seen as an example of 
academic discourse since they do not place him as a researcher in the 
philosophical field, we can register the positioning effects that the utterances 
can produce in their contexts. In so far as utterances are the linguistic 
realisations of speech acts, they are the material linguistic side of speech acts as 
elementary discursive practices (Searle, 1992: 18). Thus speech acts not only 
convey the (propositional) content p such as “to become a philosopher” in (1) or 
a description of Kant’s philosophy in (2) but they also refer to somebody 
producing the speech act: the locutor L as the source of p. In both cases we easily 
recognise the locutor of the utterances as “John”, whom one will distinguish 
from the parents, Kant or other speaking beings that are referred to in the 
example. Just as there is no speech act which is not produced by somebody, 
there is no utterance which does not reflect the position of the locutor. 
Therefore, one cannot perform any discourse without pointing to those speaking 
in discourse. Nor can one communicate without attributing some content (p) to 
the locutor and to other speaking beings in discourse. To enter a discourse, in 
other words, one cannot not occupy certain discursive positions.  
We can now ask what the subject positions are which are constructed as John 
engages in a discursive positioning practice with others. By pointing to John’s 
position in the discussion over his academic future, utterance (1) confirms his 
position in his family as a son vis-à-vis his parents. By pointing to John’s 
position in the philosophy class, utterance (2) places him as a student vis-à-vis 
his teacher. Some of the positions that John occupies in his everyday social life 
are local and ephemeral (such as the position of a young gentleman offering his 
help to an elderly person crossing the street). Yet other positions become 
durable through repetition, reciprocal ratification and can finally be laid down 
in a legal-administrative code such as a son in the family or as student in the 
school. Thus, through the positions activated in utterances (1) and (2), John is 
placed in such structured relationships, some of which allow for more discursive 
agency (e.g. when John plays out a cashier–customer relationship in a 
supermarket situation), others for less agency (e.g. when John is reminded by 
the City Council to fulfil his duty as a resident and pay his tax).  
By entering discourse, John is entangled in a heterogeneous plurality of such 
positioning practices. Indeed, John’s subject positions start to be constructed 
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before he is born (e.g. in the discourse of his parents projecting a future for 
expected offspring). A crucial event is the act of being named (“I name you 
John.”), which makes him existent in a legal-institutional structure with certain 
discursive and legal rights. As he learns to speak, he begins to actively 
participate in the positioning practices. In his family, he develops a sense of 
identity vis-à-vis others and starts to act in a way that helps him attain certain 
coveted positions (e.g. as an in-group member among his friends, a certain 
position in the football team etc.). Then, he enters the educational system and 
passes through a system of exams and grades, which attributes certain positions 
in an institutional performance hierarchy. Later, he founds a family and 
develops his professional expertise in a certain area and tries to move up the 
status ladder in the academic organisation. At every step, he participates in 
ongoing discursive positioning processes in which the positions of those 
involved are constructed in discursive struggles over who becomes visible in 
what way. Thus he has to prove a great deal of practical skill in many different 
situations in which he positions himself and is positioned by others. Some of his 
positions require little skill and energy (being a gentleman helping the 
grandmother to cross the street); some are more demanding (passing the sailing 
exam); some prescribe precise procedures and roles to be followed (joining the 
automobile club); some pose new unexpected challenges every day (acting as the 
father of his growing kids). And once he begins to build up his position in the 
space of academic research he deals with a panoply of situations each requiring 
different responses and solutions. Thus, his life turns out to revolve around the 
existential question of finding his place in the social through constructing a 
bundle of positions – a process which he never fully controls (and will go after 
his biological death if the obituary mentions his death in the local newspaper or 
friends evoke “what John would say” in their conversations). 
If the positions he occupies in everyday life (e.g. as a member of sexual, ethnic, 
political… communities) are constituted in discursive practices, the same applies 
to the positions of academic philosophers (e.g. as a member of disciplinary 
communities and universities) who are under the pressure to establish their 
place in the philosophical field. Their philosophical work is to make individuals 
visible as recognized players of the philosophical game. In an ontological sense, 
therefore, one never is a philosopher. Instead, those who participate in 
philosophical discourse are invested in a discursive practice in which some 
succeed in making his positions more coherent and identifiable, more secure and 
prestigious. As John decides to enter the philosophical game, he is subjected to 
certain dynamics which we will now look at in greater detail. 
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THE EARLY CAREER OF AN ACADEMIC PHILOSOPHER 
It is difficult to say at what point John starts to engage in a philosophical 
discourse and becomes a “real” academic philosopher as this is precisely the 
question all participants of philosophical discourse negotiate in the philosophical 
field. The difficulty is that there is no straightforward procedure for applying for 
membership in the scientific community of philosophers (like for instance in the 
automobile club which John joined when he got his driving license). There is 
not such a thing as a homogeneous community of academic researchers 
following a given set of rules (like the members of the local sailing association, 
who have all proved they can maneuver a sailing boat in the sailing exam). 
There is not even an exam testing John’s research capacity and conferring the 
status of “established researcher” on him (like exams do in the secondary 
system). Indeed, the task for John would be much easier if there was one 
straightforward way of becoming an academic philosopher. That’s why his 
challenge is a profoundly practical one: to establish a new position among the 
many other positions already existing in the world of research. 
If nobody can exist in this world without engaging in a subtle play of differences 
and demarcations, researchers like John need to respond to dilemmas which 
cannot be solved by reeling off a given recipe. One strategy which seems to have 
worked for one researcher cannot be simply applied by another researcher 
without producing something new (by copying Bourdieu one does not become 
Bourdieu but a disciple of Bourdieu’s, which is an entirely different position in 
the research space). Researchers need to find a balance between 
incommensurable imperatives: they need to create innovative positions (or they 
will be conflated with others), relevant positions (or they will not be noticed) 
and coherent positions (or they will not be identified as a distinct entity).  
Let’s observe the many activities John is involved in as he builds up his position 
in a network of positions. When John has finished his BA and Master and wants 
to start his PhD, he sets out to create relationships with different people with 
their specific backgrounds, expectations and know-how as representatives of 
both worlds of power and knowledge. In order to get admission at the 
University of Lower Stratford, he needs to talk to possible supervisors and 
discuss with them how he can relate to their work. In order to organise funding 
for his PhD, he needs to deal with funding agencies and find out about who may 
evaluate his funding proposal. In order to write the proposal, he needs to know 
about “leading” figures and relate to problems and ideas of the scientific 
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community he wants to address. In order to know more about the members of 
his community, he will attend conferences and workshops etc. An academic 
foundation recognises his past academic achievements and pays him the student 
fees for three years. And one of his abstracts is accepted for a conference on 
Enlightenment and postmodernism in which we find the following utterance 
(many more of which are produced in his PhD thesis, which is beginning to take 
shape): 
 
(3) As Sullivan (2003) rightly points out, Derrida never criticised the 
Enlightenment project, which is epitomised in Kant’s philosophical project.  
 
Unlike the simple utterances (1) and (2), pointing to one speech act each, (3) is a 
complex polyphonic utterance whose nested speech acts refer to various 
positions in the philosophical field. Given its polyphonic character, this 
utterance indicates not only the position of the locutor (i.e. John) but also a few 
other speakers and their perspectives (Nølke, Fløttum and Norén, 2004). If the 
utterances as a whole can be attributed to the locutor, the utterance that 
“Derrida never criticised the Enlightenment project.” implies the position of 
somebody else saying that Derrida did criticise the Enlightenment project. This 
complex utterance therefore evokes a complex dialogical spectacle in which 
various speakers are orchestrated in a certain way: 
 
L1 (Sullivan, 2003): “Derrida never criticises the Enlightenment project” 
A2 (an anonymous other): “Derrida criticises the Enlightenment project” 
L3 (John): No, A2 is wrong. 
L4 (John): L1 is right.  
X5 (could be Sullivan, Derrida or John): “The Enlightenment project is 
epitomised in Kant’s philosophical project.”  
 
In the formal presentation, we see that (3) not only conveys the point of view of 
the locutor. It is composed of five nested speech acts each pointing to a certain 
speaking being, whose positions the locutor either ratifies (L1, L3, L4) or keeps at 
a distance (A2). In some cases like (X5), it is not entirely clear what is the relation 
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of the position to the locutor (even though my guess would be that X5 is 
accepted by L) but the reader still learns that there is a position X5.  
Through written utterances like this one, “John” takes sides with certain 
colleagues in the field (like Sullivan) while rejecting other anonymous 
colleagues who claim that Derrida criticises the Enlightenment project. Indeed, 
his discourse operates with a great deal of virtual, fictitious and nameless others, 
which do not have to be made explicit because every member of the community 
understands who is meant (here probably the “humanist traditionalists”, some of 
which denounce Derrida for his “nihilism”). It is by playing with the knowledge 
his readers have about the various camps and currents that he shores up his own 
position as an ally of Sullivan’s and thus very likely also of Derrida’s and 
deconstructivism more generally.  
With every utterance he brings on paper in his PhD, John produces implicit and 
explicit references to others in the field. As he writes and talks he is not 
necessarily aware of the complex network of subtle distinctions he is creating as 
his primary motivation is to produce ideas. When his first publications circulate 
in the field, John starts to become visible as “somebody” for people who do not 
have to have met him personally.  The problem is that the positions he defines 
for himself by filling page after page remain merely claims as long as they are 
not ratified by others. He therefore needs to get others to produce utterances 
which refer to and reinforce the “postidealist” position which he is about to be 
known for. Indeed, by reading and writing academic texts, researchers bombard 
each other with utterances every day, as a result of which some are recognised as 
important members of the academic community while others remain invisible. 
At this point, John is becoming increasingly aware of the split between John as 
somebody existing for people he knows, and the position that is constructed of 
him in academic discourse, i.e. “John”. Indeed, while John, at this early stage of 
his career, is alive and kicking in a biological sense, “John”, the symbolic 
position he occupies on the map of academic knowledge, has not been born yet. 
At the same time, the philosophical figures which are symbolically most alive in 
his discipline (such as “Kant” and “Derrida”), could not be more dead, 
biologically speaking. Even though John and “John” are discursively constructed 
(the first as a person, the latter as a reference), they never coincide. Johns always 
interact with “Johns” (i.e. positions, places, perspectives) rather than with Johns 
(i.e. the practical beings) even though both are inextricably tied together (which 
can confront John with the difficult challenge of performing “John” at situated 
events like talks or conferences). If John has no greater ambition than to 
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eternalise himself through “John”, this is what has driven generations of 
researchers to spend their time and energy on reading and writing books and 
articles in their study: to become a recognised and legitimate being in the world 
of knowledge. And if some “Johns” later turn out to be a fraud like “Bakhtin”, 
who was not Bakhtin but somebody else, this reminds us of the discursive 
dynamics that exceeds the conscious, intentional efforts of the discourse 
participants to control the discourse which makes them exist.  
Beginning with his PhD thesis, John enters a discursive struggle to establish his 
position as “John” among other specialised knowledge producers. From the very 
first day on, he juggles with both the most local (supervisors, colleagues, friends 
etc.) and the most global positions (“Kant”). What needs to happen if John wants 
to succeed as a researcher is that “John” relates to a larger and larger number of 
other positions. As he tries to impose himself in the community, he is subject to 
a twofold pressure, i.e. on the one hand, specialisation, which is a consequence 
of the rapidly growing number of researchers worldwide (i.e. Johns), who all 
need a symbolic niche of their own (“Johns”). Since everybody needs to be 
different from everybody else, no researcher can easily live with the perception 
that another researcher has produced the same ideas already no matter in what 
language, field or university. Therefore, on the other hand, the researchers are 
subject to a universalising pressure since to shore up their position claims, they 
have recourse to the community as a whole, whose horizon is inevitably global. 
As a consequence, in the discursive game of disciplinary philosophy everybody 
is torn between specialisation and universalisation. 
In his first academic products, John weaves together locals and globals in order 
to insert his own position in the academic community. While he may or may 
not have to cite his local supervisor, who is more interested in “Kant” than in 
“Derrida”, he needs to relate to her in some way so as to place himself in the 
local hierarchies of his university with his PhD project. At the same time, John 
gets familiar with the classics of his field, who represent the questions and 
problems of researchers in philosophy departments of many other universities 
and countries. When he finishes his dissertation, his PhD is the material product 
of the positioning work John has done from local to global levels: a) locally, he 
has related to his supervisor and the other colleagues and friends working at his 
university (many of them are interested in “Kant”) and b) globally, he has 
related to the canonical references of the discipline as a whole (where “Derrida” 
has recently been established as a canonical reference).  
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As he finishes his PhD, John begins to worry about his professional future since 
neither the locals nor the globals he has integrated into his discursive project can 
promise him any jobs. The locals are under a certain pressure to recruit outside 
(at least in departments where the research orientation is stronger than the 
teaching orientation). And the globals are dead or have their own students to 
place somewhere. As a result, John becomes aware of those sociosymbolic 
relevant in between the local and global level: on the national philosophical job 
market. John is dimly aware of the possibility that unlike the global references 
pointing to researchers that mostly died away long ago, the positions of the 
“national” philosophical debate are tied to potential reviewers of his journal 
articles and project proposals and to professors who may become relevant for his 
professorial appointment someday. Thus, in his publications he starts to deal 
with positions important in his academic system (and less with positions of other 
academic systems where he can aim at no position whatsoever). As a 
consequence, he extends the network of relationships with other researchers to 
those who play some role in the national academic community. By integrating 
their positions, through explicit and implicit references, into his publications, he 
bonds with other researchers in the national field, whom he has not yet met in 
person and sometimes will never meet.  
As a result, John consolidates his position as a legitimate member of his scientific 
peer group (the “Continental philosophers”) with a new, specialised expertise 
(“deconstructive transcendentalism”, “postidealism”). His discursive practice 
straddles local, national and global horizons all the time: every week he meets 
colleagues at the Department of Southwhich, where he just started as a lecturer. 
In the official meetings, informal encounters in the hallway and in the gossip in 
the cafeteria, there are many occasions to classify him as somebody for his new 
colleagues. Soon, he is known to be responsible for certain teaching programmes 
(the one in Continental philosophy), to hang out with certain colleagues (but 
not with others), for how to organise money for conferences (he knows that 
international conferences are funded by a special budget from the Vice 
Chancellor) and how to speak to the secretaries (Marc has a child and is 
sometimes late in the morning) etc. In these manifold personal encounters, John 
needs to prove his practical know-how in negotiating his (and their) positions in 
ever new situations. If he did not participate in the local positioning work with 
his colleagues, John would risk having no voice in the decisions taken in the 
department and someday he may be charged with less prestigious obligations 
such as teaching. Even though John likes teaching a lot, he does not want to be 
classified as a teacher. As a teacher he could no longer invest as much in 
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building up his position in the research scene. Obviously, this would put an end 
to his academic ambitions: no way to become a professor as a teacher! 
Therefore, John begins to do things which, even though giving no immediate 
material recompense, promise to increase “John’s” weight on the national and 
perhaps international scene such as spending his weekends evaluating the new 
MA on Continental Philosophy his colleagues have set up at the University of 
Westumbria, acting as external examiner for PhDs for friends of his, becoming 
vice-treasurer of the section on Continental Philosophy of the British 
Philosophical Association, organising workshops and congresses, peer reviewing 
journal articles and book proposals, joining the scientific council of the 
Berlusconi Foundation of Governance (which awards one PhD scholarship every 
year in political philosophy) and giving interviews to the Bromswich Herald 
(because he thinks it’s good for “impact”). While he engages in frenzied activities 
in the world of power, he works on his position in the world of knowledge, i.e. 
among the wider community of specialised experts. The best way to create an 
impact is books, at least in his field, where journals do not count as much and 
where third-party funding is exceptional. He turns his thesis into a book by 
slimming down the mapping parts exemplified by utterances such as (3). In a 
crucial passage in the introduction, he sums up the question of this book: 
 
(4) If the transcendental ego is the basis of all knowledge, how can there be a 
knowledge of the other? 
 
Even though the utterance (4) contains no explicit reference to any other 
representatives of the field, we can still point out its complex dialogical 
organisation by means of which other researchers as well as John himself are 
positioned in a certain way. The utterance (4) combines two speech acts which 
mobilise the doxic knowledge the members of his community have about the 
authors of certain positions, notably Kant as the implicit authority stating that 
“the transcendental ego is the basis of all knowledge”. Under the condition that 
the Kant statement is correct (if-clause), the locutor (“John”) formulates “his” 
speech act, namely the question: “How can there be a knowledge of the other.” 
Since the sources of both speech acts are not explicitly identified, the readers 
will try to fill the slots by contextualising “John” and his interlocutors in the 
philosophical field. In the first part of (4), “John” not only engages in an 
exchange with Kant but with all those in the field who subscribe to the first part 
of the utterance: the “Kant disciples”, who form the implicit audience to which 
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he addresses the question of the second part. The second part, in turn, may refer 
to tendencies outside the Kant community. Thus, other may evoke 
phenomenological or pragmatist orientations as well as the more political 
discussions in feminism and postcolonialism, which the locutor presents as 
legitimate problems for the community of Kant scholars. In this way, the locutor 
takes a position at the crossroads of Kantianism and other, more postmodernist 
tendencies in the field of Continental philosophy.  
Through its indexical references to individual and collective discursive beings, 
utterances like this one instruct the discourse participants about who relates 
how to whom in the field. It is these indexical ties with the positions of others 
that make his question an important one, worthy of philosophical reflection. 
Conceptual problems and social positions in the field, therefore, need to go hand 
in hand if his research is to leave a trace.  
 
BECOMING A PROFESSOR 
After another book on deconstructive transcendentalism, an edited reader of key 
texts in Continental philosophy and two dozens articles in various philosophical 
journals and volumes, there is a nagging doubt in John over to what degree he 
has finally managed to leave a trace. A few, rather favourable reviews about his 
two books have come out. He has been invited to give plenary talks at a few 
conferences. Some of his colleagues, above all his ex-doctoral students have 
started to cite John’s work which is branded as “deconstructive 
transcendentalism”. It would be an exaggeration to say that everybody in the 
field knows him and his work even though many have heard of his concepts and 
he is reasonably cited in the works of others. In fact, the position he seems now 
to occupy in the circle of UK Continental philosophers remains a rather fuzzy 
and fragile one. When others cite him, he is not always sure they have really 
read him.  
In fact, the feeling of uncertainty is widespread among all his colleagues. 
Nobody is totally assured about his or her position in the scientific community 
because this community is based on the ephemeral play of voices and references 
in academic publications. John’s community by and large exists as the result of 
circulating texts which are read by the peers. It is true that there is a professional 
organisation of UK philosophers whose section of Continental philosophy John 
chairs by now. Yet everybody knows that their membership cards do not make 
anybody a true philosopher and the most recognised philosophers, the most 
“universal” ones representing the entire discipline, are usually not active in these 
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organisations. John’s position in the scientific community rests on the 
circulation of his texts, i.e. on his peers producing and reproducing utterances 
and references by means of which his position is consolidated in the community. 
Some of the ties and bonds among the researchers have turned into structured 
relationships such as journals or organisations which offer a range of honorary 
places (such as journal editor, peer reviewer, section chair and conference 
organiser). Yet if these positions give some (illusion of) stability in the opaque 
and shifting space of academic discourse, the scientific community will never 
pay anything but symbolic recognition to him. 
In the long run, John cannot live off the symbolic position (i.e. his reputation as 
an expert of an area) he has established in the world of knowledge. His place still 
needs to be made real and objective in the world of power. He needs, in other 
words, the institutional security as well as the regular salary, maybe also an 
office and other resources of a full senior position at a university, for which he is 
now ready to apply. His colleagues tell him about many contradictory things he 
is supposed to do and there is hardly any job committee without major rifts and 
clashes. Most decisions appear to be unpredictable and political. To some degree, 
this had been the case for his applications for more junior positions. Yet the 
appointment of a professor, who will no longer report to the Head of 
Department, gives rise for even more heated discussions among many more 
parties concerned of the university.  
He then discovers this job ad in a mailing list of academic jobs for a professorial 
position at the University of North London: 
 
(5) Full Professor of Philosophy 
 
Through the designation philosophy, the ad refers to his position as a legitimate 
and recognised member of the philosophical community in the world of 
specialised knowledge production. However, the utterance not only activates the 
position that John has tried to secure over a long time in in the community. It 
also refers to a speech act referring to somebody L inviting candidates to apply. 
Given the circumstances (the University’s logo, signed by the Head of 
Department, job description…), John recognises this word sequence as an 
utterance inviting him to apply: “(Candidates can apply for the position of) Full 
Professor of Philosophy.” Therefore, as with the utterances John processes in the 
world of knowledge, the speech act succeeds because L is in the legitimate 
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position to produce the action it describes in the world of power. It points to an 
individual or collective (such as Head of Department or Pro-Vice Chancellor and 
the university committees) who is in the position to create positions in the 
university. Such a person, who is in most cases also a knowledge producer, had 
taken a long time to create the social capital he or she needs to occupy his 
academic power position. More than specialised knowledge producers, however, 
academic decision-makers rely on formal positions and organisational rules. Yet 
especially for the most important positions in the world of power, the non-
formal resources (such as social capital within the university) as well as the 
practical knowhow (their social skills) of the power wielders are important (and 
it was a long and complicated process for the Head of the Department of 
Philosophy to get his Pro Vice Chancellor and other senior management to 
transform a vacant professorship in the Department of Education into a Chair of 
Philosophy). 
Thus, when John turns in his application, he enters a matching process between 
position making processes in the scientific communities and in the universities, 
which had started on both sides long before John thought of turning in his 
application. In order to fill positions in universities, the specialised knowledge 
producers in his field had been working on their positions and turned them into 
CVs with “marketable” profiles whereas the decision-makers of the university 
had been mustering the necessary support for the positions they want to fill in 
countless meetings, conversations and long procedures. Since matchmaking 
processes between the worlds of spcialised knowledge and organised power 
precede the formal application procedure (the formal application just being the 
last step of much longer discursive processes), the actual decision-making 
situations can appear sometimes either banal or “irrational”. To recruit 
somebody for junior as well as senior positions, there is a long preparation on 
both sides which can confirm “obvious” candidates whose application is 
sometimes just passed on in the formal procedure. But a consensus may just as 
well not arise since the new position is embedded in a complex network of links 
with many others within the university who have their own agenda. John learns 
e.g. that some in the department prefer somebody with a solid grounding in 
German idealism who can lead a large lecture class on the topic; others are in 
favour of somebody with a more analytical orientation. And of course some 
want to push their personal acquaintances. If John is finally chosen for the 
position, the bundle of positions, relationships and ties he can offer to the 
department after many years of academic experience turns out to fit in a certain 
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way with the specific configuration of positions the job entails at the University 
of North London. 
No other act can objectify John’s symbolic positions better than his recruitment 
as a professor. He may be a well-respected colleague among his peers but as long 
as this respect is not turned into a permanent position at a university, he will 
neither be fully recognised as a researcher nor will his research enjoy the 
attention they deserve among his peers. To be recruited at a university is part 
and parcel of what he needs to achieve in order to succeed as a researcher. As 
consequential as it may be for the researchers, the recruitment usually is a 
decision which does more than just institutionalise John’s position in the world 
of specialised knowledge. In recruitment, the bundle of ties and bonds he has 
come to accumulate in the scientific community is integrated into the 
organisational structure of a university. This translation can hardly follow a set 
of (“professional”) rules which are applied to identify the “best” candidate. 
Indeed, the participants need to cope with many different constraints, 
expectations and norms in order to come up with a decision that can never be 
automatic even in the presence of a strong consensus of shared professional 
values. The candidates with the most citations are not always recruited, nor 
those with the most third-party funding, nor the ones with the best personal 
contacts. In fact, the decision cannot but be contingent to the degree that there 
is not one gold standard of how to achieve academic excellence. Candidates are 
therefore not only evaluated in terms of the symbolic capital (like books and 
articles) they have accumulated over time, to use Bourdieu’s terminology. The 
recruitment procedure takes stock of the whole bundle of John’s formal and 
informal, achieved and potential positions, his entire discursive capital as it 
were, which needs to match with the potential network of relationships of the 




FROM SPECIALISED KNOWLEDGE TO ORGANISED POWER 
If recruitment is a delicate practice, this is not only due to the plurality of 
practices within the scientific communities, which is partly reflected by the 
composition of the appointment committee, but also due to the different social 
logics at work in specialised knowledge and organised power. From day one of 
his academic career, John had had to establish a position in both worlds at the 
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same time. In the recruitment procedure, the participants therefore need to cope 
with the different social logics which position researchers as legitimate members 
with a specialised expertise in a discipline and as members of a status group with 
certain decision-making rights in a university. If John failed to secure his 
position in either world, he would either become an administrator, policy maker 
or manager with no recognised specialised expertise or he would turn into a 
free-floating intellectual, an erudite or man of letters with no institutional 
backing. The fundamental problem for all researchers, therefore, is to 
consolidate their academic position by straddling both worlds of knowledge and 





By no means has John reached some sort of end point in his career when he 
becomes a professor. Even though his institutional position gives him security, 
the academic game of making his position stronger and more stable just goes on. 
In the world of knowledge, he attempts to expand his impact and presence to 
new audiences. If in order to become a professor he had to address national 
networks of peers relevant for the professorial job market, he now gets attention 
for being the originator of “post-idealism” - a new theoretical current which is 
noticed in other countries (it helps to write in English nowadays) and 
neighbouring fields (e.g. as in cultural, literary and social theory). Other 
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researchers now begin to build their careers on “post-idealism”, which they 
cannot do without positioning themselves vis-à-vis John’s work. In this process, 
John’s symbolic position as a post-idealist is more and more detached from the 
person John. John’s position-building is now almost entirely out of his hands. As 
many other researchers try to assert themselves on the research scene by 
referring to John’s work, his symbolic position is now universal enough that in 
the later stages of his career his name comes to stand in for the entire new 
current that has been developing under the label of “post-idealism”. And when 
he dies, John’s post-idealist position stays on the map of following generations of 
academic knowledge producers. 
It is of course highly unlikely that his symbolic position is canonised and I leave 
it to the curious reader to turn to the biographical, historical and sociological 
work on “great thinkers” that has been done on those individuals who have 
finally entered the halls of fame of the philosophical community. The more 
likely scenario is that after his appointment as a professor, John gets more and 
more absorbed in the world of institutional power. He discovers the university 
as an administrative organisation whose agents are in competition to secure their 
positions, yet in practices which are distinctly different from those he has seen 
in the scientific communities. Whereas his challenge in the world of knowledge 
is to realise his position as a legitimate, visible and recognised member of a field, 
current or group, in the world of power he engages in a struggle over who is in a 
position to make decisions over scarce resources, coveted positions and the 
careers of others. Just like the positioning practice in the world of knowledge, 
the practice through which his position is defined in the world of power takes 
place on local, national and global levels at once. On the departmental level, he 
continues to be involved in all kinds of committees (e.g. as a member of the 
departmental council he decides on which conference trips are funded), 
administrative tasks (such as deciding on which new students to admit) and he 
contributes to selecting new staff in the hiring committees. Not every position 
he occupies in this world of institutional decision-making is formal. He is part of 
the departmental kitchen cabinet before becoming Head of Department himself. 
In the world of power, status hierarchies are created in order to facilitate 
decision-making processes. The status groups existing in most universities are 
students, junior academic staff (lecturers, assistants and assistant professors, who 
usually have to report to members of the senior level and usually haven’t 
finished their academic qualifications), senior academic staff (i.e. mostly full 
professors, who enjoy full institutional rights, can supervise all types of students 
and can sit in on all committees) as well as administrative staff (from secretaries 
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all the way up to the senior management, who occupy in many cases professorial 
positions). Members of higher status groups (e.g. Heads of Department) are 
typically given more decision-making power than members of lower status 
groups (e.g. lecturers and students). This status hierarchy can be considered as 
part of a “universal” academic culture to the degree that few universities can 
decide not to project this institutional nomenclature onto its members. 
Embedded and reproduced in everyday decision-making practices, the four 
status positions of professor, assistant professor, student and administrative 
personnel constitutes an institutional response, confirmed in countless practices, 
to the problem that in the world of academic power not everybody can decide 
on everything, not everybody can have the same rights and not everybody can 
be a member of the academic institution. Therefore, if higher education 
institutions, at least those with the ambition to be recognised as full universities, 
are under pressure to adopt such “universal” institutional models (institutions 
with no professors are usually seen as just as deficient as institutions with no 
students), the tiered system of academic status positions in the world of power 
can be considered as the equivalence to the differentiated system of disciplinary 
specialisation in the world of knowledge (institutions which do not cover the 
entire disciplinary spectrum are usually seen as deficient institutions). 
Therefore, to establish their place among the full universities of the world, 
higher education institutions need to reflect the full range of status positions as 
well as the full range of disciplinary fields.  
Let’s return, however, to how John consolidates his position in the world of 
organised power. Just as his positions in the world of knowledge, some of his 
positions are informal and spontaneous; they emerge between the actors as they 
engage in daily interactions (e.g. who is or is not in the departmental kitchen 
cabinet). Others are officially defined and laid down in the university’s statutory 
framework. Yet his positions in the world of power are not limited to the 
informal and formal relationships he has established with the most immediate 
and local colleagues in his university. On a national level, his university is 
embedded in a system of academic governance which coordinates large academic 
populations across university organisations. The classical device of national 
academic governance is the academic job market, whose recruitment practices 
are typically regulated by national policy makers and administrators (who have 
created certain filters for who can or cannot apply for certain academic status 
positions or who have implemented a system of incentives, programs and 
schemes). Thus, the recruitment of academic staff is embedded in a complex 
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arrangement of organisational rules, practices and procedures which is highly 
specific and path-dependent of the national academic system.  
Unlike the UK, where the model of entrepreneurial governance predominates 
today, the French academic system for instance is more likely to operate with 
national exams (concours) and centralised academic qualification committees 
(CNU), which makes it almost impossible for John to be recruited in France 
despite the considerable international prestige he has gained by now. If he 
started to study German and to mingle with German academics, he could 
consider applying in the German system even though he would have to develop 
a skill in building up an academic court of assistants, secretaries and a network 
of useful contacts without which his chair position would not develop. As a 
product of the UK system, John has become a cog in the UK’s recruitment 
machine (e.g. by writing recommendations and reports on other candidates and 
his participation in appointment committees at other universities). 
John is also involved in regular evaluation schemes like the UK Research 
Evaluation Framework (REF, formerly RAE). REF monitors the research output 
of research-active academics in the UK by subjecting their activity to 
sophisticated ranking procedures. Evaluation schemes like REF in the UK, the 
AERES in France or the Wissenschaftsrat in Germany testify to new more 
‘depersonalised’ practices of exercising academic power. Where the more 
classical recruitment-centred system of academic governance subjected 
researchers like John to one-time evaluations (such as the procedure for getting 
a lifetime job), these governmental technologies subject researchers to a system 
of continuing surveillance and control by comparing and objectifying the 
performance of large academic populations. Today, the indicators and 
benchmarks of governmental technologies may camouflage the relationships the 
participants of academic discourse constantly negotiate among themselves (John 
now pretends to publish for four stars in the REF). Yet the exercise of academic 
power remains a highly practical matter and decision-making at times a 
contingent process. What changes is that academic power extends to ever larger 
academic populations which are put in hierarchical order on increasingly global 
levels. Rankings, benchmarks, and comparisons are the devices that constitute 
new hierarchies on global levels (e.g. the role the Times Higher Education and 
the Shanghai university rankings plays in the decisions of future PhD students). 
Thus, academic power is increasingly exercised in an organisational field which 
reaches beyond the nation state (e.g. the growth of research funding from the 
European Union). While the globalisation of academic power has just started, 
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the decision-making activities of a philosopher like John mainly extend to the 
local level of his university and to the national level of his academic system.  
 
CONCLUSION 
Let me conclude by summing up the theory of academic discourse as power-
knowledge which I have outlined with the help of our fictitious philosopher 
John. While inequalities among researchers are commonly justified by the 
quality of their research products, John’s story reminds us of the social 
constraints that allow certain researchers to succeed more than others. As a UK 
philosopher, his academic practices are embedded in a specific academic culture. 
More than in other disciplines of the social sciences and humanities, 
(Continental) philosophers like John usually go to great lengths to position 
themselves with respect to certain canonical figures, address not only academic 
but more intellectual questions, are especially indebted to national philosophical 
schools and traditions and are subject to rather fuzzy publication formats. More 
than in other academic systems, UK academics like John are subject to a 
sophisticated regime of bureaucratic rules, surveillance and evaluation; they 
need to deal with a strong, centralised and strategically acting management and 
an academic market environment where departments and universities need to 
compete for students and funding.   
Yet the special challenge all researchers face in all disciplinary fields and all 
academic systems is that in order to exist they need to engage in academic 
discourse as a multileveled positioning practice throughout their career. Their 
research, it turns out therefore, is considered as “excellent” to the degree that 
they make their positions visible, important and real for other researchers by 
weaving a network of ties, bonds and relationships with others in academic 
discourse. To claim, secure and stabilise their positions among the many other, 
already well-established positions, they need to mobilise their resources and 
prove their practical skills in coping with incommensurable rules, norms and 
expectations. That’s why they can never just carry out a professional recipe, a 
grammar or a structure that lays out how to act as a good researcher. Their 
challenge is a practical one as they move through an uneven, opaque, rocky 
terrain. While establishing their place in this universe, they deal with 
conflicting rules, contradictory rationalities and incompatible logics: they have 
to occupy a position among the countless specialised fields and communities (i.e. 
in the world of specialised knowledge) and they need to be placed into the 
hierarchical system of status positions of a university and an academic system 
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(i.e. in the world of institutional power). The horizons of their discursive 
practice are not restricted to a national field; they reach from local to global 
levels: in the world of knowledge they need to relate to others through networks 
of personal friends as well as through the canonical references of global 
disciplinary communities. Similarly, in the world of power they need to address 
the immediate colleagues in their department and university as well as to defend 
their positions in the national academic systems and the global academic space. 
In academic discourse, therefore, it is existential for researchers to straddle the 
social logics of specialised knowledge and institutional power. At the same time, 
they are often involved in other worlds as well such as teaching and the mass 
media, whose specific social logics need to be elaborated somewhere else. 
While all these worlds testify to profoundly social dynamics, it is necessary to 
overcome the split between symbolic and social, between conceptual and 
material logics of explanation, which has characterised knowledge-oriented (e.g. 
the focus on concepts in intellectual history) as well as power-oriented 
approaches (e.g. the focus on resources in the sociology of higher education and 
of intellectuals). From a discursive point of view, we have conceived of research 
as an activity aiming at the construction of positions which are both social and 
symbolic. In this view, researchers cannot process ideas without participating in 
a discursive play of positions. However much they concentrate on expressing 
and conveying a certain idea, they cannot help but negotiate their own place 
among the other positions already existing in the space of research.  
More generally speaking, we can now understand social order as an emergent, 
unintended effect of a plurality of on-going discursive practices. In this view, 
discourse does not represent the social. Instead, by representing ideas, discourse 
(i.e. the utterances that the participants process) constitutes the social. Social 
order, therefore, cannot be seen as a constituted structure, which can be read off 
from the textual surface of a discourse; it needs to be constituted as a practical 
achievement by the discourse participants. At the same time, discourse 
participants can exist only in discourse as they try to make themselves visible 
with their positions whose making they never entirely control.  
After all, it is a challenge for any discourse participant to find his or her place in 
the social where the problem is precisely that order is not fully constituted and 
where subjects do not exist as constituted entities. Not everybody is equally 
successful in surviving this game. If some are more successful in research, it is 
not their capacity of discovering abstract truths but their concrete skills as well 
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